An interesting and thought provoking article in the New York Times recently on The Pandemic is a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. In the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma two players are playing: if both refuse to turn on the other player they share the reward, if one turns on the other one will reap the entire reward while the other receives nothing, if both turn on each other both get nothing.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is related to Common Pool Resource problems in as much as it deals with how a group makes decisions to exploit that resource and whether an individual follows the collective strategy for exploitation or if s/he defects and consumes more than his/her allocation.
In a scenario, for example, where groundwater is the scarce resource, the challenge is to establish the collective limit on exploitation and allocate that amount amount between the various “players” or stakeholders. Establishing limits and allocation depends upon individual cooperation with the group. Trust is a a critical element to establishing and agreeing to resource limits and allocation. Detection and deterrence against defection are also critical factors.
Game theorists distinguish between one-round (single games) and repeating (multiple round) games. Repeatability allows for the building of trust – which suggests suggests multiple small steps rather than grand bargains. Trust also requires that defector detection rates must be sufficiently high so as to be an effective deterrent.
Where these seem to intersect is when there is uncertainty as to the sustainability of the underlying resource (as there always is). This article (How uncertain tipping points induce common pool resource destruction) finds that higher levels of uncertainty are linked to less cooperation and thus are more likely to result in permanent resource depletion.
The challenge for planners is: (a) how to create an environment in which cooperation is the preferred option, and (b) how to detect and deter defectors from the socially optimal solution?
Perhaps not too surprisingly higher quality information more readily available to all stakeholders is, or should be, a key element of any strategy for managing CPR. Certainly this is one of the take away lessons from The Future of Groundwater in California which highlights the need for both trust and reliable accepted data.
None of this is really rocket science. Still, a few questions arise:
- How should one incorporate the prisoner’s dilemma and uncertainty into Systems models?
- Might one use Agent Based Models to better understand the effects of uncertainty on individual (and in aggregate collective) decision making around actual use of common pool resources?